

**ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF KANT'S ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE  
[Between Physical Determinism and Transcendental Freedom]**

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**1. Introduction: Kant's Paradoxical Two Worlds of Determinism and Freedom**

*The Determined World of Appearances*

Immanuel Kant, justifying the successes recorded in Newtonian science of his time, posited that our experiences of physical events [what he calls "appearances"] follow strict causal laws of the physical sciences. In his major work, *The Critique of Pure Reason* [CPR] he presents his 'analogies of experience' as the lawlike presuppositions that ground all experience and determine our abilities to impute necessary connections [law-governedness] among appearances and between the appearances and theoretical objects. Thus for him, "experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions" [B218:208].<sup>1</sup> And Kant has three of such analogies of experience, which he presents within the framework of the Newtonian Fundamental Laws of Mechanics. In the 1<sup>st</sup> edition of the CPR, he formulated the general principle of the analogies thus: *All appearances are, as regard their existence, subject a priori to rules determining their relation to one another* [A176-77:208]

As well, Kant specifies that substance is permanent and immutable: "In all change of appearances, substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished" [B225-26:213]. In the 2<sup>nd</sup> Analogy, he states that causality is strictly based on the determined sequence of events according to a rule: "All alterations take place in conformity with the law of cause and effect" [B232]. A Cause is "the real upon which, whenever posited, something else always follows ... [that is] the succession of the manifold ... is subject to a rule" [B184:185].

*The Free World of the Moral Will*

However, Kant also noticed that our wills are free, and impact some events in the physical realm of the world of Ethics. In elaborating these analogies of experience, Kant [perhaps influenced by Hume] removes the Aristotelian efficient causality, thus effectively eliminating the centrality of free human agency. This excision is supported from his discourse in the paralogisms [or fallacious syllogisms] against Cartesian rational psychology, wherein he denies that the self is a substance, and affirms that it is merely an *empirical consciousness*. Correspondingly, the notions of self-identity and agency that are so important in moral theory are therefore largely ignored, because for Kant, their introduction will compromise the neat divide between the will and the coherent causal principles of the natural order which, according to him, are necessary and universal.

This dialectic of freedom and determinism creates a paradox [or antinomy] of two incompatible worlds/logics for Kant. Realizing the problems this parallel way of thinking of the world would bring, in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Antinomy, Kant tries to resolve the antinomy that exists between the notion of transcendental freedom and his strict determinism. He insists that the laws of nature, which scientists adopt in their investigations, are needed for the very possibility of experience. He concedes that the two domains of freedom and nature are parallel; and that at best the necessary order of nature does not eliminate the realm of transcendental freedom.

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<sup>1</sup> The numberings beginning with "A" refer to the 1<sup>st</sup> edition of the CPR and the "B"s refer to the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. The succeeding numbers refer to the sections and paragraphs. This is the standard international format for citing the CPR, in order to capture the hermeneutic turns that Kant takes in revising his works.

But it is questionable that Kant succeeds in this endeavor of resolving the antinomy. Indeed I shall argue that he does not. And that it is because of (1) the vacuity or emptiness of the notion of the self that pervades the whole of the CPR, and which is not adequately treated in the *synthesis* of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Antinomy, (2) the division of the world into two realms – the free intelligible will, and the empirical causal realm, and (3) the lack of proper attention to the linguistic employment of the concept of “cause” in a public life-world – that is basically at the root of his failure.

I shall start by giving a brief reconstruction of Kant’s 2<sup>nd</sup> Analogy. I shall also elucidate his notion of the self, in order to highlight some problems which are inherent in his theses of causality and the self in the paralogisms. I shall argue that it is the combined problems arising from these two themes that Kant attempts to resolve in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Antinomy. Finally, I shall argue that Kant’s attempts at reconciliation of causality and freedom fall short mainly because of (1) and (2) above. And the major implication for morality is that attention has to be paid to (3).

## 2. *Analysis of the Second Analogy:* [A189-211/B232-56]

Kant uses his Second Analogy of Experience to explain “the principle of succession in time, in accordance with the law of causality” [B232]. For him causal connection of appearances means that “all alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect” [B232]. The corollary to this is the 2<sup>nd</sup> law of mechanics [the 1<sup>st</sup> law of motion of Newton which states that *every body remains in its state of rest or motion in the same direction and with the same velocity unless it is compelled by an external force to deviate from this state.*] So every change of matter has an external cause, [MN AK 543:104]. These insights are strengthened by the main argument for the second analogy as captured effectively in this passage:

In order that this relation be known as determined, the relation between the two states must be **so thought** that it is thereby determined as necessary which of them be placed before, and which after, and that they cannot be placed in the reverse relation. But the concept which carries with it a necessity of synthetic unity can only be a pure concept that lies in the understanding, not in perception; and in this case it is the concept of the relation of cause and effect, the former of which determines the latter in time, as its consequence – not as in a sequence that may occur solely in the imagination (or that may not be perceived at all). Experience itself – in other words, empirical knowledge of appearances – is thus possible only in so far as we subject the succession of appearances, and therefore all alteration, to the law of causality; and, as likewise follows, the appearances, as objects of experience, are themselves possible only in conformity with the law [B234].

Here, Kant, in endorsing Newtonian laws of motion, seeks to avoid the difficulty encountered in the traditional notion of causality which involved the awkward notion of that which is permanent, yet changes. Thus, he offers to examine “... the empirical criterion of ... substance which appears to manifest itself not through permanence of appearance, but more adequately and easily through action”, [K1, B249ff/A 204].

In giving his transcendental proof of the second analogy, Kant argues that it is the conceptual presupposition of the necessitated order of perceptual appearances and the necessitated order of the corresponding states represented by those appearances that serve as the necessary condition for rendering objective succession of perceptual appearances as real experience of events. For Kant, if particular individual events of the same kind occur in a

determinate reality, then they also are subsumed under a general causal law or uniformity.<sup>2</sup>

The Transcendental Proof deducible from this goes thus:

- (1) At the level of (mere) perception, what is apprehended is always a succession of appearances; one appearance following upon another.
- (2) We are able to recognize the occurrence of objective events, that is, of real changes in the state of an object, distinguishing them from the merely subjective changes of appearances for an observer.
- (3) Thus, given the character of all appearances stated in (1), the experiential achievement noted in (2) is possible ONLY IF the scientist makes the assumption that there is a rule that necessitates the order of the succession of some of those appearances, thereby giving them an “objective meaning” (*objektive Bedeutung*) as representations of a corresponding real change in an object.
- (4) Thus, objective succession (that is, change of states in an object) is a possible object of experience ONLY IF that succession or change of states is itself necessitated, that is, causally determined. In other words, the principle of causality is valid for all possible experience of objective change.<sup>3</sup>

This fourth premise is a non-sequitur, there is no ground for the requirement of causal determination for “all possible causes”, from the previous premises.

Here, Kant wants to specify that (1) strict succession is necessary to distinguish real change from the mere illusion of it; hence the relation of succession must be thought of as objective, [A194/B239]. And (2) for the change to be objective, it must have the character of necessity and irreversibility, i.e., it must be *determined*. Likewise, the first version of this analogy,<sup>4</sup> by requiring that things “presuppose something upon which it follows...” underscores the concept of the permanence of substance as the real, [A144/B184], which, whenever it is posited, something else follows. This indicates the importance of causal dependence – “*the presupposition of something upon which it follows...*” – and likewise, the importance of the temporal precedence of that which is presupposed as cause over that which follows as its effect. This shows that what is represented as permanent [substance] is produced by prior existing substance(s). In other words, in the sequence of events A and B, the succession must be *order-dependent* and irreversible. This implies that an uncaused substance [as for instance, Spinoza’s *causa sui*] is

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2 This point stands out most clearly perhaps, in the following important passage from the second Analogy:

“Thus, if I perceive that something happens then in this representation it is contained, first, that something precedes, because it is precisely in reference to this that the appearance acquires its time-relation: namely, to exist after a preceding time in which it was not. But it can acquire its determinate temporal position in this relation only insofar as something is presupposed in the preceding state upon which it always - i.e., in accordance with a rule follows. It then follows, first, that I cannot reverse the order and place that which happens prior to that upon which it follows, and second, that if the preceding state is posited, this determinate event inevitable and necessarily follows [A 198/B 243-4]. Hence to say that “B” has a cause “C”, is to say that “B” is related to “C” by a uniformity or causal law; and it thereby follows that the universal causal principle must assert the existence of particular causal laws or uniformities as well”. Cf. Friedmann, M., Causal Laws and Natural Science, in Guyer, P., 1995:171.

3 Charron, W., Class Notes, 1999:41-42

4 “Everything that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it follows in accordance with a rule.” [A189].

unthinkable according to the Kantian scheme.<sup>5</sup> Kant wanted, no doubt, to safeguard the move from succession of appearances “A” to “B” to the necessity of the states “A” or “B”, or “AB” in an object. But what he does in effect is to draw a very thick line between what is from necessitated succession of states and possible – causal nature; and what is “not-necessitated” and therefore not possible – freedom.

To see how this thick line is drawn let us now take a look at the other domain of nature – the domain of the self, which again, Kant [like] Hume empties of “substantial content” as-it-were. It is this vacuity of the self, which, though valid as a method, [since Kant uses it as the connectedness of our perceptions produced by the synthetic activity of the mind], that yet creates difficulty for the very notion of freedom that Kant wants to establish.

### ***3. Kant’s Notion of the [empty] Self – [From the Paralogisms]***

Kant’s theory of the self is reflected in the treatment of the *transcendental unity of apperception*, and in the doctrine of *the paralogism of pure reason*, wherein he targets the rational psychology of Descartes which tries to establish a body of knowledge concerning the self through the transcendent use of reason. Descartes claims that the self is a substance, indivisible and permanent, capable of surviving beyond the material world, in which the personal identity of the person is anchored. From this then, arises the idea that the soul is immaterial, spiritual, and incorruptible [A345/B403]. For Kant though, the rational psychologist [Descartes] has succeeded in deriving four paralogisms from the transcendental apperception - the “I think”:

- (1) the first [of the form: “the cogito, the residual ultimate in the methodic doubt of Descartes, the one idea that I am left with, and beyond which I cannot go, is a self”] concludes that the self is a substance from the fact that the “I” is always the subject of thought and never a predicate [A348-9/B401-7].
- (2) That because the several representations contained in the single thought cannot be thought by many different subjects, therefore the self is simple, i.e., indivisible, not composed.
- (3) That the self is a person, a substance with self-consciousness and self identity because of its numerical identity over time

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<sup>5</sup> It is unthinkable because it lacks the very possibility of motion or *that upon which the presupposition [dependence] is based*, and hence the “*something ... which follows*” does not make sense here anymore, since it is not “following” from anything. In other words, if there is no presupposition, there is no “following”. And since when there is nothing that proceeds, nothing can be said to “follow”. And because there is no dependence, there is likewise, absence of temporal sequence, for time is the measure of the extent/duration of permanence or succession. The temporal sequence is, as it were, indeed empty. And for Kant, the very idea of “empty” time is untenable, for such a concept is not only purely counter-intuitive, it does not render itself perceptible to the cognitive faculties. There is nothing to be encountered by the faculties in trying to know it. It is neither an empirical nor a pure intuitional object. So, to think therefore of some “empty time”, or a cause that will be outside the time series, or to have some substance that will be totally free [independent] of the chain of causes and effects is to court an antinomy.

(4) That outer objects are ideal whereas the existence of the “I” is known immediately and with certainty [A366-9]; so its existence is independent of that of outer objects, including one’s body, because according to Descartes, the self can be conceived without the body. [B409].

Of these four paralogisms, Kant alleges [in A349-380/B407-9] that Descartes makes a wrong inference by committing an equivocation between a logical and non-logical sense of ‘subject’, because the categories of substance, simplicity, and so on, are employed transcendently in the major premises, but are applied empirically in the minor premises and conclusions [A402-3]. For Kant, the question of the constitution of the “I think” has no *a priori* answer [A398], hence the Cartesians are misled by a natural and non-arbitrary transcendental illusion [B426-7]. The only thing that can be said genuinely of the self is that it is cognizable only as an empirical appearance: it can amount to only a ‘physiology of inner sense, capable perhaps of explaining the appearances’ of the self [A347/B405].<sup>6</sup> Here, Kant splits the self into the noumenal and the phenomenal, the one underlying to the empirical dimension, which is governed by causal laws of nature, and the other relating to the area of freedom and absolute spontaneity. Gardner comments that, “... Kant’s central claim that the self is known only as appearance is incoherent, on the grounds that Kant has no intelligible account of the relation of phenomenal to noumenal selves or of the self’s ‘self-affection’, and ... Kant cannot avoid commitment to the claim that we have knowledge of the self as a thing in itself.”<sup>7</sup>

Another attempt Kant makes to solve this problem is in the CPR [B132], where Kant characterizes the “I think” as – pure unity of apperception; the subject in which the manifold of experiences is found; an act of spontaneity which does not belong to sensibility; that which can give rise to *a priori* knowledge; my self-consciousness, the “I am”; the condition under which all these have a unity. In one way or another, these characterizations emerge in the *locus classicus* of the theory of the self in the CPR is B133, wherein Kant describes it as:

... the empirical consciousness, which accompanies different representations, is in itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject. That relation comes about, not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in so far as I *conjoin* one representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Only insofar, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in these representations [B133]

This assertion means that there are three ideas of the self operative in Kant’s scheme, the empirical consciousness, the original unity of apperception performing the synthesis of the flux of diverse mental states, and the psychological or noumenal self. It is only when I perform some operation of conjoining different representations or recognize some relation among my representation do I recognize that I have them; and only through such an operation does the idea of the subsisting self become possible. In this citation then, we can easily see the connection

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6 Gardner, S., 1998:608

7 Gardner, S., 1998:609.

between the idea of the self and that of causality. They both contain and imply the notion of a necessary operation of some kind of connection in the mind or in consciousness according to a rule. The unity of consciousness resides in the connectedness of our perceptions produced by the synthetic activity of the mind.

Another dimension of the notion of the self, wherein also the denial of substantiality to the self comes out full force is in Kant's polemics with Cartesian rational psychology and the constitution of the synthetic unity of apperception. Here Kant presents **the thesis** for transcendental freedom as the demand of reason for completeness, and as affirming that without assuming that there is such a causality of absolute freedom, the causal series would not be complete and we would be thrown into infinite regress. Now, this contradicts the thesis of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Analogy's principle of causality which asserts that everything that happens has a sufficient cause for its occurrence.

Kant offers his mediation between causality and freedom via his transcendental idealism.[A528-32/B563-85]. For transcendental idealism takes the object of knowledge in a twofold sense: as the effects of both an intelligible causality, by virtue of which they are free, and an empirical causality, by virtue of which they are empirically determined. He suggests that in line with the theory of transcendental idealism, it is possible for a conditioned event to be caused by a non-empirical [noumenal?] object, itself in relation to other antecedent appearances. In other words, any proper human action such as pounding on the table, could arise both from the agent's intelligible character and freedom, and from the empirical character due to the regularities of nature [A539/B567].

But since the intelligible character and intelligible causality are not considered to be in temporal sequence, the action which flows from freedom, is not considered as under the order of knowledge. "A subject's intelligible character cannot be known therefore, since it is not appearance; but it may be thought, as in some way mirroring or analogous to its empirical character."<sup>8</sup>

And Kant offers us his proof of transcendental idealism regarding causality thus:

1. Transcendental idealism grants that appearances are always grounded in objects that are not themselves appearances, [A537-9/B565-7].
2. We know ourselves to be subjects of apperception, which is not empirically conditioned and to possess faculties that are not objects of sensible intuition, namely understanding and reason, [A546-7/B574-5].
3. Our reason has a causality of its own independent of that of nature, or rather we represent it to ourselves in such terms. [A547-8/B575-6].

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<sup>8</sup> Gardner, S., 1998:613.

And so to suppose that none of this is possible or to assume that events must be either free or caused by laws of nature, that freedom and determinism are exclusive, as is assumed in the proof of the antithesis, to the detriment of human freedom, is untenable. Only transcendental realists would hold such a view!

Schematically stated, what Kant has shown is that:

4. the antinomial thesis wrongly affirms freedom, whereas the antithesis wrongly denies it
5. but each is true in its own right and in its own domain - with modification, both may emerge as true, hence
6. the thesis contains the truth that freedom is conceivable, and
7. the antithesis is right that everything that takes place, follows the laws of nature, but
8. not that human freedom strictly exists, instead it is plausible that,
9. Freedom is at least not incompatible with nature [A577-8/B585-6]. Therefore,
10. although we cannot know whether we are free, equally we cannot know that we are not.

Correspondingly, syllogistically put, on causality Kant's theses on substance and the self show that:

11. Substance is the real.
12. Whatever is real is the presupposition for causality. Whatever falls outside substance is unreal.
13. But the self [against rational psychologists] is not substance [and consonance with transcendental idealism] is noumenal.
14. It falls outside substance. And is therefore unreal.
15. Therefore it cannot be the presupposition for causality.

But from the mediation what Kant seems to be saying is something like this:

16. That because of 2, 11 is true of 13, i.e., that they are both true. [Which is contradictory]
17. Given 10, 2 is impossible.
18. But given 6,8,9, we can at least hope for a logical, not real possibility, of the self. But even if 9 is true, 14 contradicts it. Yet, Kant wants to urge a sort of probabilism based on 6 and 9!

So I think that indeed the mediation fails because of these, and the following reasons:

- a. The *non-sequitur* of the conclusion of the transcendental proof as reconstructed by Charron.
- b. The antinomy arises in the background of the strong incompatibility between the noumenal domain of spontaneous causality and causal world of scientific phenomena. But Kant does not even address this in the mediation. He simply restates the problem as-it-were, namely that the domains are indeed different, and causality is true of each in its proper objects.
- c. Because of the emptiness of the notion of the self sustained in the paralogisms and the epistemological constitution of the synthetic unity of apperception.

#### 4. *Concluding Remarks: Implications for Ethics*

There have been several responses to Kant's thesis and its consequences. Kant's strict causal scheme denies agent causality and leads to determinism. His theory of the self lacks an adequate theory of the self. It, leads to a barren conception of *person* as an a-historical self, and does not tell a causal story. This impoverished notion would make moral theory difficult since morality is founded and funded by good understanding of the freedom of the well integrated human person. What is needed is a thesis of the self and causality that appreciates the fact that the notion of causality makes sense only within the context a public life-world wherein the terms cause/effect are used as part of a living language. Among the possible implications for morality, I wish to focus mainly on the issue of determinism and absence of agent causality and lack of a public language world.

##### *a. Determinism:*

The most obvious consequence of accepting Kant's, 2<sup>nd</sup> analogy with its strict successivity of appearances, is that it commits one to determinism. Peculiar to Kant's notion of thoroughgoing causality therefore, is the rejection of the notions of efficient cause and intelligent causality, and the stipulation of strict mechanistic succession in line with the endorsement of the Newtonian laws of motion. This is implicit in the rejection of non material causes [for substance is matter for him] in the 4<sup>th</sup> proposition/conclusion to the transcendental proofs of the 2<sup>nd</sup> analogy. The rigor it stipulates is such that if one attempts to posit actions outside this rigid scheme, especially with regard to human moral obligations, one finds oneself in the grips of an antinomy.

##### *b Absence of Agent Causality:*

The absence of agent causality is shown in the fact that none of the texts regarding causality and which we examined includes it. This is consonant with the very structure of Kantian substance. Kant stipulates that "Causality leads to the concept of action, this in turn to the concept of force, and thereby to the concept of substance.... Wherever there is action – and therefore activity and force – there also is substance, and it is in substance alone that the seat of this fruitful source of appearances must be sought. ... [A]ctions are always the first ground of all change of appearances, and cannot therefore be found in a subject which itself changes, because in that case other actions and another subject would be required to determine this change" [A 204/B249-50].

In the light of Kant's denial that the self is a substance, and that substance does not refer to a knowing subject therefore, it becomes clear that he was not speaking of human action. Thus, this *action* is merely fortuitous, bare, and not based on knowledge.<sup>9</sup> Change, for Kant concerns only the state of the substance, not its coming to be. Substance simply is. It is immutable, hence its change is only alteration. *Creatio ex nihilo* is therefore excluded:

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<sup>9</sup> Also this sense of 'action' is also far from the meaning of the Aristotelian principles of change Act and Potency, because it is devoid of the dynamism associated with them whereby that which acts is in consistent movement of self-realization of its nature or its flourishing towards its *telos*.

For if coming to be out of nothing is regarded as an effect of a foreign cause, it has to be entitled creation, and that cannot be admitted as an event among appearances, since its mere possibility would destroy the unity of experience. [On the other hand, when I view all things not as phenomena but as things in themselves, and as objects of the mere understanding, then, despite their being substances, they can be regarded in respect of their existence, as depending upon a foreign cause. But our terms would then carry with them quite other meanings and would not apply to appearances as possible objects of experience], [K1, B251-2].

Note that the reluctance to allow the notion of creation is therefore not because of its inherent lack of merit – an argument into which Kant does not even enter – but because it will compromise scientific “neatness” or coherence with known scientific laws. Kant’s theory therefore, is at the service of the Newtonian project. It is at the service of truth as scientific coherence with no existential or “personal” implications, contriving action without “passion” [the accusative case], a cause without causal agent or a public world, Kant, knowledge without individual knowers, and causal effects without transitivity of action.

The use of the visual paradigm (of the order of succession of the appearances of objects), further strengthens the poverty of the Kantian notion of the person. In this, the mind is reduced to something like a movie screen where the images are merely projected; the mind exists, and is useful only to offset the colors whereas the objects in themselves are actually unknowable.

#### *d. Need for an Objective Public World for Morality*

Another implication following from these is the total lack of a public, causal life-world within which events can be framed as stories belonging to intelligent human persons, with the ability to know, think, deliberate, decide, will and act – terms all of which underscore the incision of the ethical realm into this discourse. Thus to speak of causality devoid of the co-occurrence of the human moral factor is to impoverish the discussion beyond philosophical relevance. This is what Kant seems to have done, especially in the conclusion of the transcendental proofs. But Kant recognized the antinomical consequences of his theses, hence he sought to remedy the situation by proffering a mediation in his treatment of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Antinomy [K1, A444-451/B 472-479:409-415].

The cardinal point made variously by P.F. Strawson, Susan Stebbing and Elizabeth Anscombe, is that the sterility of Kant’s system and the failure of his resolution of the antinomies stems from the utter lack of a public world wherein the common sense notion of cause and its more specialized nuances for the scientist may be laid out, and the implications for morality considered.

For Strawson, Kant’s treatment of objectivity is managed under a considerable limitation, almost, it might be said, a handicap. For Kant nowhere depends upon, or even refers to the factor which Wittgenstein for example, insists so strongly: the social character of our concepts, the links between thought and speech, speech and communication, communication and social communities. Such notions are needed if the causal process is to impact meaningfully, the domain of daily human existence. Because for us to admit the conceivability of a multiplicity of objective

worlds, they must at least take account of this factor; that another name for the *objective* is the *public*. Otherwise, Strawson opines, Kant's two-world theory may not be any different from an individual consciousness imagining and claiming what it likes about independent objective worlds, without adequate guarantees for unsympathetically exclusive standard of objectivity and truth.<sup>10</sup> Strawson submits therefore that "a necessary condition, then, of admitting spatially independent worlds of experience is that the members of a cultural community should be able to claim a shared membership of such a world, or rather, should find such a claim more compelling than the diagnosis of their mutual cohering stories as a kind of harmonious dreaming"<sup>11</sup> But this as corroborated equally by Stebbing and Anscombe, is lacking in the Kantian scheme.

Susan Stebbing approaches the social context of the causal story from within the context of "common sense" point of view. She captures the puzzle of cause/effect and freedom in their connection to a public world of uniformities and multiformities. For her, uniformities are occurrences that we are accustomed to regard as being regularly connected; and multiformities are those that we consider to be accidentally, or casually, conjoined. And causal character is the knowledge of the regular behavior of things.

Kant's subjective successivity, is unsatisfactory from the point of view of *Stebbling's common sense notion of causality which* recognizes that the occurrence of an effect depends upon the nature of the things that are brought into relation, e.g. If you pinch Indian rubber, it will change its shape, but if you pinch a table it will not. Thus, from this we can see that Stebbing's position has something Kant's position lacks, (even though she agrees with him that causality is not a thing, but a relation), namely that it is possible to know something about the real object that is in the relation, since we can predict some of its behavior given that we are conversant with its causal character; whereas Kant's transcendental idealism which insists on the contribution of one's mental set to the appearances makes this near impossible. In Kant's scheme, we cannot know the real object. All we are aware of are its modes. Kant's causal scheme services Newton's theories of dynamics. It tells us no causal story. It therefore services the critics' charge that philosophy is useless for real life. It describes the phenomenon of successivity of appearances and their possible and necessary sequence but we are not the wiser about things – and how their internal structures [causal characters like, solubility, fading, persisting, elasticity, etc.] lend themselves to possible explanatory hypothesis.

Anscombe likewise points out the lack of a public language life-world in the discussion of causality. First, to Hume's and Kant's inability to "find" a cause or "observe causality in the individual case" she simply points out that "causality" is not something we "find": "Someone who says this is just not going to count anything as

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<sup>10</sup> Strawson, P.F., 1966:151-2.

<sup>11</sup> Strawson, P.F., 1966:152.

‘observation of causality’. This often happens in philosophy; it is argued that ‘all we find’ is such-and-such, and it turns out that the arguer has excluded from his idea of ‘finding’ the sort of thing, he says we don’t ‘find’”.<sup>12</sup>

And, if, as Kant endeavors in the 3<sup>rd</sup> analogy to indicate that perceptions reflect objective reality, ‘why is it most difficult to admit that our possession of a common language in which causal concepts feature is at least an index to the fact that causation is real,’ Anscombe asks.

She further berates the mechanics of Newton as giving Kant the conviction that there is an iron necessity with which all things are strung together.

The high success of Newton’s astronomy was in one way an intellectual disaster; it produced an illusion from which we tend still to suffer. This illusion was created by the circumstance that Newton’s mechanics had a good model in the solar system. For this gave the impression that we had here an ideal of scientific explanation; whereas the truth was, it was mere obligingness on the part of the solar system, by having had so peaceful a history in recorded time, to provide such a model. ...Let us pretend that Newton’s laws were still to be accepted without qualification: no reserve in applying them to electrodynamics; no restriction to bodies traveling a good deal slower than light; and no quantum phenomena. Newton’s mechanics is a deterministic system; but this does not mean that believing them commits us to determinism. We could say: of course nothing violates those axioms or the laws of the force of gravity. But animals, for example, run about the world in all sorts of paths and no path is dictated for them by those laws, as it is for planets.”<sup>13</sup>

If one pays attention to language, she argues, it will become obvious that the matter cannot be resolved by a physicist’s fiat. The way cause is used for the solar system differs from its use in sociology, and for the human person. And she asks;

Why this difference? A natural answer is: mechanics does not give the special laws of all the forces. Not, for example, for thermal, nuclear, electrical, chemical, muscular forces. ... . It is one thing to hold that in a clear-cut situation – an astronomical or a well-contrived experimental one designed to discover laws – ‘the result’ should be determined: and quite another to say that in the hurly-burly of many crossing contingencies whatever happens next must be determined; or to say that the generation of forces (by human experimental procedures, among other things) is always determined in advance of the generating procedure; or to say that there is always a law of composition, of such a kind that the combined effect of a set of forces is determined in every situation. It has taken the intervention of indeterministic physics to shake the rather common dogmatic conviction that determinism is a presupposition, or perhaps a conclusion, of scientific knowledge.<sup>14</sup>

Remarks such as these, scathing though they may be, rudely awaken us, it seems, to the fact that sometimes we forget, and so need to be reminded of the real, public world in which we live and operate, and that this world is a world in which we also “do” things with words, and we seek to be understood when we do so. And Kant’s special immanent Metaphysics may lead us to this sort of forgetfulness which may be inimical to moral discourse.

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12 Anscombe, G.E.M., in van Inwagen, 1998:248.

13 Anscombe, G.E.M., in van Inwagen, et al. 1998:253

14 Anscombe, G.E.M., in van Inwagen, 1998:253-4, 256

I conclude in agreement with these ideas of Anscombe: 'My actions are mostly physical movements. And if such movements are physically determined by processes which I do not control, then my freedom is perfectly illusory. The truth of physical indeterminism is thus indispensable if we are to make anything of the claim to freedom. But certainly it is insufficient. The physically undetermined is not thereby 'free'. For freedom at least involves the power of acting according to an idea, and no such thing is ascribed to whatever is the subject (what would be the relevant subject?) of unpre-determination in indeterministic physics. Nevertheless, there is nothing unacceptable about the idea that 'physical haphazard' [Stebbling's multiformalities] should be the only physical correlate of human freedom of action; and also of the voluntariness or intentionality in the conduct of other animals which we do not call 'free',<sup>15</sup> as we designate ourselves to be.

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<sup>15</sup> Anscombe, G.E.M, in van Inwagen, et al., 1998:256